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A VERY MODEST PROPOSAL
Mattas F Travieso-Diaz*ONE of the most important bilateral issues that needs to be ad-
dressed by the United States and Cuba is the resolution of out-
standing claims of U.S. nationals' for the uncompensated
expropriation of their assets in the early years of the Cuban Revolution.
Although members of other groups also experienced uncompensated ex-
propriations, their claims are neither recognized under current U.S. law
nor suitable for inclusion in the claims resolution process discussed here. 2
*Retired Partner, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Washington, D.C.). J.D.,
1976, Columbia University; Ph.D., 1971, Ohio State University; M.S., 1967, B.S.,
1966, University of Miami. See, e.g., Matias F. Travieso-Dfaz, Some Legal and
Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban Nationals' Expropriation Claims
Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 217 (1995); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Al-
ternative Remedies In A Negotiated Settlement of the U.S. Nationals' Expropriation
Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 659 (1996); and Matias F.
Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban Nation-
als' Expropriation Claims against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. 217 (1995).
1. The term "U.S. nationals" means, in the claims context, those natural persons who
were citizens of the United States at the time their properties in Cuba were seized
by the Cuban Government, as well as corporations or other entities organized
under the laws of the United States and 50% or more of whose stock or other
beneficial interest was owned by natural persons who were citizens of the United
States at the time the entities' properties in Cuba were taken. See 22 U.S.C.
§ 1643a(1) (1994). Individuals and entities meeting this definition were eligible to
participate in the Cuban Claims Program established by Congress in 1964 to deter-
mine the amount and validity of their claims against the Cuban government for the
uncompensated taking of their properties after January 1, 1959. See 22 U.S.C.
§ 1643 (1994).
2. These groups include former Cuban nationals who are now citizens or permanent
residents of the United States, current Cuban nationals who are on the island or
abroad, and U.S. nationals who for some reason failed to gain certification of their
expropriation claims under the Cuban Claims Program. See Rolando H. Cas-
tafieda & George P. Montalvin, Transition in Cuba: A Comprehensive Stabiliza-
tion Proposal and Some Key Issues, in 3 ASCE, CUBA IN TRANSITION 11, 25
(1993), available at http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v03-cas-
monl.pdf [hereinafter ASCE-3]. The facts surrounding all those sets of expropria-
tions are similar, as is Cuba's failure to provide compensation to any of those
groups of claimants. Id. But these categories of claimants would also compete for
the very limited resources that would be available at this time to provide remedies
to the claimants. Id. Also, it has been asserted that there is no legal or moral basis
for providing a remedy for property losses and not compensating those who have
suffered all manner of torts at the hands of the Cuban Government-"involuntary
or uncompensated work, unjust imprisonment, loss of life or limb, loss of loved
ones, physical or psychological abuse and harassment by agents of the state, dis-
3
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Resolution of the expropriation claims issue may be difficult while the
current socialist regime is in power in Cuba. While Cuban officials have
from time to time expressed a willingness to discuss settlement of the
claims with the United States, such willingness is usually expressed in the
context of setting off those claims against Cuba's alleged right to recover
from the United States hundreds of billions of dollars in damages due to
the U.S. trade embargo and other acts of aggression against Cuba.3 To
date, the Cuban government has given no indication that it is prepared to
negotiate without preconditions to a potential settlement of the U.S. ex-
propriation claims.4 But a serious effort will eventually need to be under-
taken by the main interested parties-the governments of the two
countries-to address the expropriation claims issue. It thus merits con-
sideration of how the process of resolving the claims can be started.5
continuance of pension payments, etc." Id. Even the authors, however, conclude
that the cost of providing compensation for tort claims "defies imagination," and
argue that no remedies should be provided for either tort or property claims. Id.
at 25, 30.
3. This position is expressly set forth in Article Three of Cuba's Law 80 of 1996,
which reads in relevant part:
The claims for compensation for the expropriation of U.S. properties in
Cuba nationalized through that legitimate process, validated by Cuban
law and international law referred to in the preceding article, may be
part of a negotiation process between the Government of the United
States and the Government of the Republic of Cuba, on the basis of
equality and mutual respect. The indemnification claims due to the na-
tionalization of said properties shall be examined together with the in-
demnification to which the Cuban state and the Cuban people are
entitled as a result of the damages caused by the economic blockade and
the acts of aggression of all nature which are the responsibility of the
Government of the United States of America.
Ley Ndmero 80: Ley de Reafirmaci6n de la Dignidad y Soberanfa Cubanas [Law
80: Law on the Reaffirmation of Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty] art. III, GACETA
OFICIAL (Dec. 24, 1996, Extraordinary Edition), available at http://www.http:!
www.cuba.cu/gobierno/antidoto.htm; see also Cuba: Reaffirmation of Cuban Dig-
nity and Sovereignty Act, 36 I.L.M. 472 (1997) (providing English translation). In
addition, "on May 5, 2000, the Civil and Administrative Court of Law at the Ha-
vana Provincial People's Court rendered Judgment no.47 on Civil Case number
[one], pursuant to the lawsuit of the People of Cuba vs. the Government of the
United States, for financial damages inflicted on Cuba, filed by the country's social
and mass organizations." Lawsuit against the United States for Financial Damages,
CUBAvsBLOOUEO (2013), http://www.cubavsbloqueo.cu/en/lawsuit-against-united-
states-financial-damages. The court found that the damages resulting from the
trade embargo and other U.S. attacks on Cuba's economic and social targets re-
sulted in damages of over $121 billion U.S. dollars. "The Court ordered the U.S.
Government to pay reparations and compensation to the Cuban people for this
amount." Id.
4. Matias F. Travieso-Dfaz, Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Expropri-
ated U.S. Property in Post-Castro Cuba, in 12 ASCE, CUBA IN TRANSITION 101,
101 (2002) [hereinafter Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Expropri-
ated U.S. Property in Post-Castro Cuba].
5. Since the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba
effective July 1, 2015, representatives of the two countries have been meeting to
discuss a possible resolution of the expropriation claims issue. See, e.g., Frances
Robles, Cuba and U.S. to Discuss Settling Claims on Property, N.Y. TiHmEs, Dec. 5,
2015 at A4.
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The uncompensated expropriation of U.S. nationals' assets in Cuba was
one of the leading causes of the deterioration in relations between the
two countries in the early 1960s and the imposition of the U.S. embargo
on trade with Cuba, which remains in place to this date.6 The outstanding
expropriation claims is recognized as one of the main obstacles to the re-
establishment of normal relations between the United States and Cuba,
and current steps to improve ties can only achieve limited progress until
the issue is seen as resolved or, at least, demonstrable progress is made
towards such a resolution.7
The resolution of outstanding property claims is also a pre-condition to
major foreign capital flow into Cuba.8 As long as property titles remain
unsettled, foreigners may perceive investing in Cuba as a rather risky pro-
position (which is true for other reasons as well) and may be discouraged
from stepping into the country. 9
There are two additional reasons why resolution of the outstanding
property claims of U.S. nationals must be a matter of high priority.' 0
First, U.S. laws require resolution of U.S. nationals' expropriation claims
before the embargo on trade with Cuba is lifted and foreign aid can re-
sume.11 Second, apart from any legal requirements, resolution of U.S.
6. President Kennedy officially imposed the trade embargo in February 1962. See
Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 7, 1962). Previously, authorization
had been suspended for most industrial export licenses to Cuba. 43 DEvr. STATE
BULL. 715 (1960). President Eisenhower had also reduced the quota of Cuban
sugar in the U.S. market to zero. See Proclamation No. 3383, 25 Fed. Reg. 13131
(Dec. 21, 1960). Other laws enacted in the 1960-62 period imposed additional
trade restrictions. Joint Corp. Comm. on Cuban Claims, Key Events - US Property
Claims, CERTIFIED CUBAN CLAIMS, http://www.certifiedcubanclaims.org/
keyevents.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). Therefore, by the time President Ken-
nedy proclaimed a total trade embargo, trade between the United States and Cuba
was already essentially cut off. See id. For a chronology of key events in the impo-
sition of the trade embargo. Id.
7. Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Expropriated U.S. Property in Post-
Castro Cuba, supra note 4, at 102.
8. Id.
9. All countries in Central and Eastern Europe that implemented schemes to settle
expropriation claims experienced a great deal of initial uncertainty over property
rights. This uncertainty discouraged potential investors and has delayed privatiza-
tion efforts. CHERYL W. GRAY ET AL., EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRI-
VATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 4 (World Bank
Discussion Paper No. 209, 1993).
10. Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Expropriated U.S. Property in Post-
Castro Cuba, supra note 4, at 102.
11. Section 620(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits U.S. assistance to
Cuba until Cuba has taken "appropriate steps under international law standards to
return to United States nationals, and to entities no less than fifty percent benefi-
cially owned by United States citizens, or provide equitable compensation to such
citizens and entities for property taken from such citizens and entities on or after
January 1, 1959, by the government of Cuba." 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (a)(2) (1994).
Also, the LIBERTAD Act, or Helms-Burton Law, includes as a precondition to
declaring that a "democratically elected government" is in power in Cuba (thereby
authorizing the provision of significant economic aid to Cuba and the lifting of the
U.S. trade embargo) that Cuba has made "demonstrable progress in returning to
United States citizens (and entities which are fifty percent or more beneficially
owned by United States citizens) property taken by the Cuban Government from
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nationals' expropriation claims has been since the days of President Ken-
nedy's administration one of the stated political conditions for the full
normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba. 12 These
factors demand the eventual negotiation of an agreement between the
United States and Cuba towards the resolution of the expropriation
claims of U.S. nationals.
By contrast, no bilateral issues require that Cuba provide a remedy to
other claimants for the expropriation of their assets by the Cuban Gov-
ernment. 13 Therefore, the resolution of those expropriation claims can
proceed on a separate track, and may be handled by Cuba as a domestic
political and legal issue.14
such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 1959, or providing full compensa-
tion for such property in accordance with international law standards and prac-
tice." See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. ch. 69A
§§ 6062(b)(2)(B), 6064, 6066(6) (1996)). The Helms-Burton Law further expresses
the "sense of Congress" that "the satisfactory resolution of property claims by Cu-
ban Government recognized by the United States remains an essential condition
for the full resumption of economic and diplomatic relations between the United
States and Cuba." Id. 22 U.S.C. ch. 69A § 6067(d).
12. See, e.g., Lisa Shuchman, U.S. Won't Ease Embargo Against Cuba, Official Says,
PALM BEACH PosT, Apr. 29, 1994, at 5B (quoting Dennis Hays, then Coordinator
of Cuban Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, as saying that before the United States lifts
the trade embargo against Cuba, the expropriation of American-owned property
by the Cuban Government will have to be addressed); Frank J. Prial, U.N. Votes to
Urge U.S. to Dismantle Embargo on Cuba, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 1992, at Al (quot-
ing Alexander Watson, then Deputy U.S. Rep. to the United Nations, as stating in
an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations that the United States
chooses not to trade with Cuba because "among other things Cuba, 'in violation of
international law, expropriated billions of dollars' worth of private property be-
longing to U.S. individuals and has refused to make reasonable restitution."').
While there has been relatively little recent explicit discussion of the claims issue in
U.S. Government circles, there is no doubt that both the Executive and Congress
will insist on resolution of the claims. See, Background Briefing, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE (July 17, 2015), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/stlenglish/texttrans/2015/07/
20150720316695.html#axzz3gcnltrXV; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, As U.S. and Cuba
Relations Warm, Property Claims Issue Is Revived, N.Y. Times, July 20, 2015, at
A10. Accordingly, it is reasonable to anticipate that the claims issue will continue
to be included in future bilateral talks between the United States and Cuba.
13. MATIAS F. TRAVIESo-DIAZ, INST. FOR CUBAN AND CUBAN-AM. STUoIs, UNIv.
OF MIAMI, Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Properties
in Cuba, in CONFISCATED PROPERTIES IN A POST-CASTRO CUBA: Two VIEWS
(2003) [hereinafter Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated
Properties in Cuba].
14. Many Cuban nationals whose properties were seized by the Cuban Government
subsequently moved to the United States and became U.S. citizens. Some of these
Cuban-Americans have advocated being added to the U.S. claimants class (so they
can be included in an eventual U.S.-Cuba settlement) or, alternatively, being rec-
ognized as not bound by an agreement between the United States and Cuba and
being permitted to pursue their claims in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Alberto Diaz-Mas-
vidal, Scope, Nature and Implications of Contract Assignments of Cuban Natural
Resources (Minerals and Petroleum), in 4 ASCE 54-62 (1994). There is some pre-
cedent for including through ad hoc legislation the claims of individuals who were
not U.S. citizens at the time of the expropriations in the settlement of U.S. claims
against another country. Such an inclusion would require legislation amending the
Cuban Claims Act along the lines of a bill that was passed by Congress in 1955 to
include individuals who were U.S. citizens as of August 1955 in the U.S. war claims
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The discussion that follows proposes a series of steps that can be imple-
mented sequentially over a period of years to address the expropriation
claims of U.S. nationals, should Cuba decide it wants to resolve the issue.
While a number of claim resolution proposals have been advanced,' 5
these do not fully consider the economic and political conditions in which
Cuba will find itself when it decides to deal with the problem or the prac-
tical limitations posed by those conditions. The steps described here can
be initiated within a relatively short period of time and without the dis-
bursement of extremely large amounts of money.
I. HISTORICAL SUMMARY
A. SYNOPSIS OF CUBA'S EXPROPRIATIONS
Cuba seized the properties of U.S. and other foreign nationals on the
island starting in 1959, with the bulk of the expropriations taking place in
the second half of 1960.16 The process started in 1959 with the takeover
of agricultural and cattle ranches under the Agrarian Reform Law;17 it
reached a critical stage in July 1960 with the promulgation of Law 851,
which authorized the expropriation of the property of U.S. nationals;t 8
such was carried out through several resolutions in the second half of
1960, again directed mainly against properties owned by U.S. nationals,
although those of other foreign nationals were also taken; 19 and contin-
against Italy. See 22 U.S.C. § 1641c. There may be political pressures emanating
from the Cuban-American community in the United States to have such legislation
enacted, particularly if it does not appear likely that the Cuban American claim-
ants will find adequate redress under a parallel claims resolution program that is
instituted in Cuba. Enactment of such legislation, however, will almost certainly
be opposed by the existing certified U.S. claimants, whose share of a lump settle-
ment would be decreased if the claimant class was enlarged and (as is likely to be
the case) the negotiated settlement amount was less than 100% of the certified
value of the claims. In addition, such legislation would raise numerous questions,
including its potential inconsistency with well-settled international law principles
under which a state can only act to protect the interests of those who were nation-
als of that state at the time the adverse action was taken. See D.W. GREIG, INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 530-31 (2d. ed. 1976).
15. See, e.g., CREIGHTON UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAw & DEP'T OF POLITICAL Sci., REPORT
ON Ti-iF RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING PROPERTY CLAIMS BETWEEN CUBA &
THE UNITED STATES (2007). A survey of the proposals that have been presented
for addressing the expropriation claims is presented in JESUs V. Bu MARCIHECO,
DEMANDAS DE PROPIEDAD ENTRE CUBA Y Los ESTADOS UNIDOS-UNA REVI-
SION DE LA LITERATURA (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392782.
16. For a detailed description of the process by which Cuba expropriated the assets of
U.S. nationals, see MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: TI-IE
DEMISE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CUBA 69-108 (1975).
17. Ley de Reforma Agraria [First Agrarian Reform Law], GACETA OFICIAL (June 3,
1959); see also First Agrarian Reform Law, TRUMAN Eou., http://revolutions.tru
man.edu/cuba/aboutme.htm#_ftnref2 (last updated June 4, 2014).
18. Ley No. 851, del 6 de julio de 1960 [Law 851 of Nationalization of July 6, 1960],
GACETA OFICIAL (July 7, 1960); see also Cuba. Nationalization Law. July 6, 1960,
55 AM. J. INT'L L. 822, 822-24 (1961) (providing English translation).
19. Resolution No. 1, GACETA OFICIAL (Aug. 6, 1960); Resolution No. 2, GACETA
OFICIAL (Sept. 17, 1960); Laws Nos. 890 & 891, GACETA OFICIAL (Oct. 13, 1960);
Resolution No. 3, October 24, 1960. For a listing of laws, decrees and resolutions
by means of which Cuba's expropriations of the assets of U.S. nationals were im-
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ued through 1963, when the last U.S. companies still in private hands
were expropriated. 20 In a parallel process, most assets owned by Cuban
nationals, except for small parcels of land, homes, and personal items
were seized at various times between 1959 and 1968.21
The laws issued by the Cuban Government to implement the expropri-
ations of the holdings of U.S. nationals contained undertakings by the
state to provide compensation to the owners. Nevertheless, no compen-
sation was ever paid.2 2
B. THE U.S. CLAIMS CERTIFICATION PROGRAM
In 1964, the U.S. Congress established the Cuban Claims Program,
under which the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United
States (FCSC) was given authority to determine the validity and amount
of claims by U.S. nationals against the Government of Cuba for the tak-
ing of their property since January 1, 1959.23 The Cuban Claims Program
of the FCSC was active between 1966 and 1972. During that time, it re-
ceived 8,816 claims by U.S. corporations (1,146) and individual citizens
(7,670).24 It certified 5,911 of those claims, with an aggregate amount of
$1.8 billion; 25 denied 1,195 claims, with an aggregate amount of $1.5 bil-
lion; and dismissed without consideration (or saw withdrawn) 1, 710
plemented, see FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF TIF
CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM 78-79 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 FCSC REPORT], availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/fcsc/docs/final-report-cuba-1972.pdf.
20. Gordon, supra note 15, at 105-106.
21. See, e.g., Nicolis J. Guti6rrez, Jr., The De-Constitutionalization of Property Rights:
Castro's Systematic Assault on Private Ownership in Cuba (1994) (Address at the
American Bar Association's 1994 Annual Meeting, New Orleans, La.), reprinted in
1 LATIN AM. Bus. L. ALERT 5 (1994).
22. Law 851 of July 6, 1960, which authorized the nationalization of the properties of
U.S. nationals, provided for payment for those expropriations by means of thirty-
year bonds yielding two percent interest, to be financed from the profits Cuba
realized from sales of sugar in the U.S. market in excess of three million tons at no
less than 5.75 cents per pound. The mechanism set up by this law was illusory
because the United States had already virtually eliminated Cuba's sugar quota.
See Proclamation No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414-01 (July 8, 1960) (reducing Cuba's
sugar quota in the U.S. market by ninety-five percent). Nonetheless, the inclusion
of this compensation scheme in the law constituted an explicit acknowledgment by
Cuba of its obligation to indemnify the U.S. property owners for their losses.
23. 22 U.S.C. §§1643-43m (1994).
24. 1972 FCSC REPORT, supra note 18, Ex. 15.
25. Id. The value of the certified Cuban claims exceeds the combined certified
amounts of all other claims validated by the FCSC for expropriations of U.S. na-
tionals' assets by other countries (including the Soviet Union, China, East Ger-
many, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Vietnam, and others). FOREIGN CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT COMM'N, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 146 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 FCSC
REPORT]. The combined certified amounts from expropriations by all other coun-
tries is approximately $1.24 billion. FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N, 2013
ANNUAL REPORT 50 (2013). The total amount certified by the FCSC is almost
double the $956 million book value of all U.S. investments in Cuba through the
end of 1959, as reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Jose F. Alonso &
Armando M. Lago, A First Approximation of the Foreign Assistance Requirements
of a Democratic Cuba, in 3 ASCE, CUBA IN TRANSITION 168, 201 (1993). The
valuation of the U.S. nationals' expropriation claims has never been established in
an adversary proceeding. The FCSC certification process involved administrative
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claims.26
Of the $1.8 billion in certified claims, over 85% (about $1.58 billion)
corresponded to 898 corporate claimants, and the rest (about $220 mil-
lion) was spread among 5,013 individual claimants. 27 There were only
131 claimants-ninety-two corporations and thirty-nine individuals-with
certified claims of $1 million or more; only forty-eight claimants, all but
five of them corporations, had certified claims in excess of $5 million.2 8
These figures show that the U.S. claimants fall into two general catego-
ries: a small number of claimants (mostly corporations) with large claims,
and a very large number of claimants (mainly individuals) with small
claims.
Although the Cuban Claims Act did not expressly authorize the inclu-
sion of interest in the amount allowed, the FCSC determined that simple
interest at a six percent rate should be included as part of the value of the
claims it certified. Applying such interest rate on the outstanding $1.8
billion principal yields a present value, as of July 2015, of approximately
$8 billion. This amount does not include the value of the claims that were
disallowed for lack of adequate proof, nor those that were not submitted
to the FCSC during the period specified in the statute.
II. LEGAL BASES FOR U.S. NATIONALS'
EXPROPRIATION CLAIMS
The expropriation claims by U.S. nationals are based on well-estab-
lished principles of international law that recognize the sovereign right of
states to expropriate the assets of foreign nationals in the states' territory,
but require "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation to aliens
whose property is expropriated.29 The "prompt, adequate and effective"
compensation formulation was coined in 1938 by U.S. Secretary of State
hearings in which only the claimants introduced evidence on the extent and value
of their losses. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 531.
26. 1972 FCSC REPORT, supra note 18, Ex. 15. It should be noted that in 2005, pursu-
ant to a request from then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the FCSC con-
ducted a Second Cuban Claims Program, whose purpose was to effect the
adjudication and certification by the FCSC of claims for uncompensated taking of
United States nationals' property by the Cuban government that arose after May
1, 1967, and were not adjudicated in the original Cuban Claims Program. Com-
pleted Programs-Cuba, FCSC, http://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba (last
visited Feb 15, 2016). The FCSC received a total of five new claims, denied three
of them, and certified the other two claims in the total principal amounts of
$51,128,926.95 and $16,000.00, respectively. Id.
27. 1972 FCSC REPORT, supra note 18, Ex. 15.
28. Id.
29. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (1983), aff'd, 765 F.2d 159
(Fed. Cir. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW
H 185-90 (1965). U.S. courts have held that Cuba's expropriations of the assets of
U.S. nationals violated international law because Cuba failed to provide adequate
compensation, and because it carried the expropriations out in a discriminatory
manner against U.S. nationals and conducted them for purposes of retaliation
against the U.S. Government. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F.Supp.
375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds,
376 U.S. 398 (1964); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272 F.Supp. 836, 838
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Cordell Hull.3 0 Under current practice, the "prompt" element of the
Hull formula means payment without delay.31 The "adequate" element
means that the payment should reflect the "fair market value" or "value
as a going concern" of the expropriated property.32 The "effective" ele-
ment is satisfied when the payment is made in the currency of the alien's
home country, in a convertible currency (as designated by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund), or in any other currency acceptable to the party
whose property is being expropriated. 33 Cuba has clearly failed to satisfy
its obligations under international law with respect to providing compen-
sation for the properties it seized from U.S. nationals. 34
III. A VERY MODEST PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING U.S.
NATIONALS' EXPROPRIATION CLAIMS
A. INTRODUCTION
Any proposal for the resolution of the U.S. nationals' expropriation
claims against Cuba must recognize the objectives that a claims program
needs to achieve, the fundamental differences between the various types
of property subject to claims, and the practical limitations that will be
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 383 F.2d 166, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1967). For a more general
discussion, see Gordon, supra note 15, at 109-152.
30. A shorthand sometimes used for the Hull formula is that of "just compensation,"
meaning "in the absence of exceptional circumstances ... an amount equivalent to
the value of the property taken .. . paid at the time of the taking .. . and in a form
economically usable by the foreign national." Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the
Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Ex-
propriation, 85 A.J.I.L. 474, 475 (1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONs LAW § 712 (1987).
31. IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE
WORLD BANK GUIDELINES 163 (1993).
32. ALAN C. SwAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMic RELATIONs 774-76 (1991).
Shihata explains the "adequacy" element of compensation as follows: "Compensa-
tion will be deemed 'adequate' if it is based on the fair market value of the taken
asset as such value is determined immediately before the time at which the taking
occurred or the decision to take the asset became publicly known." Shihata, supra
note 30, at 61. Shihata goes on to define fair market value as the amount that a
willing buyer would normally pay to a willing seller after taking into account the
nature of the investment, the circumstances in which it would operate in the future
and its specific characteristics, including the period in which it has been in exis-
tence, the proportion of tangible assets in the total investment and other relevant
factors. Id. at 161-162.
33. Id. at 163.
34. It has been the conclusion of U.S. courts and legal scholars that at least some of
the expropriations of the assets of U.S. nationals, such as those arising from
Law 851 of July 6, 1960, were contrary to international law on the additional
grounds that they were ordered in retaliation against actions taken by the United
States to eliminate Cuba's sugar quota, and because they discriminated against
U.S. nationals. Although the expropriations were contrary to international law for
one or more reasons, they were legally effective in transferring title to the assets to
the Cuban state, and therefore the breach of Cuba's international law obligations
must be seen as giving rise to a duty by Cuba to provide compensation to the
former owners of the properties, but not necessarily to an inescapable obligation
to provide restitution of the property to them.
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encountered by the Cuban government as it seeks to provide remedies to
U.S. (and possibly domestic) expropriation victims.3 5 The interaction be-
tween these factors adds a significant degree of complexity to the
problem.
There are also fundamental differences among the property interests
covered by the claims, which suggests that certain remedies may be better
suited for some types of property than for others.3 6 For example, restitu-
tion of residential property may be extremely difficult, both from the le-
gal and political standpoints;3 7 on the other hand, monetary
compensation may be an inadequate remedy where the property is
unique, such as in the case of beach-front real estate in a resort area.
Cuba will also be confronted with political and financial limitations to
its ability to provide certain remedies. A settlement that results in huge
financial obligations over a long period of time may be resisted politically
by, among others, the Cuban generations that have come of age after the
expropriations occurred. The discussion that follows will seek to identify
how these factors come into play with regard to the remedies that may be
provided.
B. CUBAN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRECEDENTS
It is instructive to examine the precedent of the settlement agreements
that Cuba has negotiated with other countries for the expropriation of the
assets of their nationals.3 8 Those agreements have five important facts in
common: (1) all were negotiated over long periods of time; (2) none ad-
hered to the "Hull Formula" and, in particular, none implemented the
"adequacy" standard, in that they were lump sum, country-to-country set-
tlements that did not equal the amounts claimed by the nationals for the
loss of their properties; (3) the payments were made in installments,
rather than all at once; (4) the payments were in either the currency of
35. MATIAS F. TRAVIESO-DIAZ, THE LAWS AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF A FREE-MARKET
CUBA: A PRosPECrUS FOR BUSINESS 74 (Quorum Books, 1996) [hereinafter
Travieso-Diaz, LAWS AND LEGAL SYSTEM].
36. Id.
37. See Juan C. Consuegra-Barqufn, Cuba's Residential Property Ownership Dilemma:
A Human Rights Issue Under International Law, 46 RUTGERS L.R. 873 (1994) (dis-
cussing the difficulties that a Cuban government will face in seeking to provide
remedies for residential property expropriations.)
38. Cuba has entered into settlement agreements with five foreign countries for the
expropriation of the assets of their respective nationals in Cuba: France, on March
16, 1967; Switzerland, March 2, 1967; United Kingdom, October 18, 1978; Canada,
November 7, 1980; and Spain, January 26, 1988. See El Proceso de Expropiacion e
Indemnizaciones en Cuba, CUBAVSBLOQUEO, http://www.cubavsbloqueo.cu/ (last
visited Feb. 28, 2015); see also Michael W. Gordon, The Settlement of Claims for
Expropriated Foreign Private Property Between Cuba and Foreign Nations other
than the United States, 5 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 457 (1973). Under those
settlements, claims were settled at a fraction of the assessed value of the expropri-
ated assets. The Spanish claims, for example, were valued at $350 million but were
ultimately settled for about $40 million. Even this limited amount was not paid
until 1994, six years after the claims were settled and three decades after the claims
accrued.
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the country advancing the claims or, as was the case with Spain and Swit-
zerland, in trade goods as well as currency; and (5) all agreements were
negotiated between Cuba and the state representing the claimants, with-
out claimant participation.39
While these precedents are not controlling, they are indicative of the
kinds of terms that Cuba may seek if monetary compensation is the stan-
dard used for the negotiations. Clearly, an agreement with the United
States patterned after these historical precedents would provide only a
fraction-perhaps a small fraction-of the amounts sought by the
claimants.
C. THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS
The President of the United States has wide, but not plenary, power to
settle claims against foreign governments for the uncompensated taking
of property belonging to U.S. citizens.40 The U.S. Department of State,
under authority delegated by the President, acts on behalf of U.S. claim-
ants in the negotiation of their claims with an expropriating foreign coun-
try. 4 1 Under the "doctrine of espousal," the negotiations conducted by
the Department of State are binding on the claimants, and the settlement
that is reached constitutes their sole remedy.42
In most agreements negotiated in the past, the United States and the
expropriating country have arrived at a settlement involving payment by
the expropriating country to the United States of an amount that is a
fraction of the total estimated value of the confiscated assets.43 The set-
tlement proceeds are then distributed among the claimants in proportion
to their losses. In most cases, the settlement does not include accrued
interest, although a 1992 settlement with Germany over East Germany's
expropriations of U.S. nationals' assets did include the payment of simple
interest at the approximate annual rate of three percent from the time the
U.S. properties were taken."
39. Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Expropriated U.S. Property in Post-
Castro Cuba, supra note 4, at 106-07.
40. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981); Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at
245. The President's authority is limited by the rarely exercised power of Congress
to enact legislation requiring that a settlement seen as unfavorable be renegoti-
ated. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688-689 & n.13.
41. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680 & n.9 (listing ten settlement agreements
reached by the U.S. Department of State with foreign countries between 1952 and
1981).
42. Id. at 679-80; Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1523
(D.C. Cir. 1984); RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY Lump Sum AGREEMENTS 6 (Charlottesville: Univ.
of Va. Press 1975).
43. For example, the United States settled its nationals' claims against the People's
Republic of China for $80.5 million, which was about 40% of the $197 million
certified by the FCSC. Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at 239; see also Agreement on
the Settlement of Claims, U.S.-China., May 11, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 551 (1979).
44. Letter from Ronald J. Bettauer, Assistant Legal Adviser for Int'l Claims and Inv.
Disputes, U.S. Dep't of State, to claimants (May 29, 1992); Agreement Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Fed-
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Under standard practice, U.S. claimants may not "opt out" of the set-
tlement reached by the U.S. Government. Dissatisfied claimants are
barred from pursuing their claims before U.S. courts or in the settling
country.4 5 This traditional settlement agreement process would not ap-
pear to be adequate to satisfy the expectations of the parties in the Cuban
situation.
The amount of the outstanding certified claims by U.S. nationals is so
large that it would likely outstrip Cuba's ability to pay a significant por-
tion of the principal, let alone interest. In addition, Cuba already has a
very large external debt.4 6 Any additional obligations to U.S. claimants
would only exacerbate Cuba's debt situation. For those reasons, a tradi-
tional settlement involving payments to all claimants adding up to a large
sum of money, even if payment is spread out over time, would likely
place Cuba in difficult financial straits and be unacceptable.
D. PROPOSED APPROACH
The very modest approach proposed here recognizes that it will not be
feasible to address all pending claims at the same time or in the same
manner. Accordingly, the claim resolution process would proceed in
three separate stages of increasing complexity, spread over a significant
period of time. The goal of the process is to provide a remedy to the
greatest possible number of claimants, and accommodate as much as pos-
sible the needs and desires of the rest.4 7
1. Stage One: Lump Sum Payments to Individual and Corporate
Claimants with Claims of $1.5 Million or Less
The total amount of the top 100 claims certified by the FCSC (not in-
cluding interest) is $1,635,211,668, with the remaining 5,811 claims total-
ing $164,336,899.48 All but the top 100 claims are for amounts of $1.5
million or less. 4 9 This means that if funds could be made available in the
amount of $165 million, it would be possible to fully compensate the vast
majority of the claimants for the principal amount of their certified losses
(but no interest) and would provide compensation for essentially all resi-
dential, farming and small enterprise losses.5 0 Alternatively, funds in the
eral Republic of Germany Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims,
U.S.-Ger., May 13, 1992, T.I.A.S. No. 11,959.
45. See, e.g., Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at 248-49.
46. Cuba's external debt is $25 billion, a staggering 40.6% of the country's Gross Do-
mestic Product. The World Factbook-Cuba, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html (last updated Feb. 25, 2016).
47. It is important to recognize that the approach proposed here, like any other that is
developed by the Executive and agreed to by Cuba, would probably have to be
endorsed by Congress before it can be implemented.
48. 1972 FCSC Rvpowr, supra note 18, Ex. 15.
49. See id.
50. Residential property and small farms are good candidates for a compensation rem-
edy because such a remedy avoids the potential need to dispossess current occu-
pants to those properties, who may have acquired legal rights to them and whose
eviction might be politically untenable; see Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 30, at
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amount of $293 million would compensate all but the top fifty certified
claimants, and would cover the principal of all certified claims under $5
million.51
One potential source of funds for such lump payments could be
blocked Cuban assets under the control of the U.S. Government. As of
the end of 2014, the U.S. Treasury Department reported that there were
blocked assets valued at $270.33 million in which either Cuba or a Cuban
national has an interest.52
But many of these assets are likely to be unavailable or belong to third
parties. 53 Therefore, it would first be necessary to ascertain the true own-
ership of the assets, and then shelter-through new legislation-those
that belong to Cuba from those raising claims, under legislation passed by
Congress in 1996 and 2000, of personal injury or death as the result of
actions by the Cuban Government. 54 To the extent the frozen assets are
909-12. In addition, owners of residential or small farming property in a foreign
country may be generally less likely to desire restitution of those assets over fifty
years after they were taken.
51. A 100% level of recovery would greatly exceed the recovery level in all other
"lump sum" settlements negotiated by the United States under the International
Claims Settlement Act programs. See 1994 FCSC REPORT, supra note 24, at 146.
On the other hand, providing fifty percent compensation for the certified principal
of all but the top 100 claims would call for payment of only $83 million.
52. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Terrorist Assets Report Calendar Year 2014,
TREASURY DEP'T, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/tar2014.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
53. Miami Lawyer: Blocked Cuban Assets are Dwindling, ALONG THE MALECON, (Jan.
8, 2011), http://alongthemalecon.blogspot.com/2011/01/miami-lawyer-blocked-cu
ban-assets-are.html.
54. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 protects, subject to specified excep-
tions, the property of foreign states or their agencies and instrumentalities from
damages claims by private parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2012). One of the ex-
ceptions to this immunity permits suits against certain foreign states (including
Cuba) for terrorist acts or provision of material support thereto. Id. §1605(a)(7).
Under that provision (known as the Terrorist Act Exception) and a counterpart
provision in the criminal code, U.S. nationals have the right to recover treble dam-
ages, plus attorneys' fees, for injuries to person, property or business incurred as a
result of international terrorism. But the Terrorist Act Exception also allows the
President to waive the ability to execute any judgments that are obtained in such a
suit against blocked assets of the foreign government. Id. §1610(f)(3). In 2000,
however, Congress enacted the "Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000." Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections) (2000). Section 2002 of the Act allows plaintiffs holding certain
judgments against Cuba to recover against blocked Cuban assets. Id. § 2002. The
legislation was intended to permit recovery of judgments awarded to the families
of the Brothers to the Rescue pilots whose planes were shot down by Cuba in
1996. See Jonathan Groner, Payback Time: Pushed by Terror Victims, Bill to Ease






ed-90e8-41ce6c1c9bfl; see also Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.Supp. 1239
(S.D. Fl., 1997). The Alejandre court allowed the recovery of $187 million in com-
pensatory and punitive damages which, under the 2000 legislation, could be recov-
ered against Cuba's blocked assets. Since the Alejandre case was decided, a
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unavailable, Cuba will need to identify some other source of funds to
satisfy the lump-sum payment portion of any settlement of U.S. national
expropriation claims.
2. Stage Two: Private Claimant-to-Cuba Negotiations
a. Direct Negotiations
As a second step in the claims settlement process, the top fifty or 100
U.S. claimants would be authorized to obtain relief directly from Cuba
for their expropriation claims.55 This relief would be sought in direct,
individual negotiations between the claimants and the Cuban Govern-
ment under the sponsorship and oversight of the U.S. Government.
Claimants would waive their right to receive any lump-sum settlement
proceeds and instead negotiate directly with the Cuban Government for
restitution of their expropriated assets, investment concessions, payments
in commodities other than cash, or compensation by means of state obli-
gations.5 6 While there is no direct precedent for such a procedure and
the U.S. courts have ruled that individual claimants have no right to ne-
gotiate directly with the debtor government,5 7 in the case of Cuba such a
flexible settlement may prove to be in the best interest of all parties.5 8
number of court judgments have awarded damages to claimants against Cuba
under the 2000 law, and the frozen Cuban assets have been periodically depleted.
See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG RESEARCll SERV., RL31258, Surrs AGAINST TER-
RORIST STATES BY VicrIMs OF TERRORISM 12 (2008), available at https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31258.pdf.
55. Any of the over 5800 claimants that could receive a lump sum distribution under
Stage One could arguably waive their right to receive such a settlement and join
the participants in Stages Two or Three, but given the relatively limited amounts at
stake they would be unlikely to do so unless they were interested in remedies other
than monetary payments, such as restitution of real or residential property. Con-
versely, some of the 100 certified claimants excluded from the lump sum settle-
ment might challenge the process on various legal grounds, including the argument
that the framing of the lump sum settlement and their exclusion from the settle-
ment constitutes a taking without just compensation of property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The ultimate disposition of
those arguments would be in the hands of the courts, but as the U.S. Supreme
Court found in Dames & Moore, where articulating a settlement process is "a nec-
essary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our
country and another" and where "Congress [has] acquiesced in the President's ac-
tion," the President has the power to settle such claims in the manner he deems
suitable. 453 U. S. at 688.
56. In November 2000, a task force of former U.S. Government officials and other
public figures established by the Council on Foreign Relations issued a report that
recommended a number of initiatives to prepare for a transition in bilateral rela-
tions between the United States and Cuba. The task force, headed by former As-
sistant Secretaries of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard W. Aronson and
William D. Rogers, recommended among other steps resolving expropriation
claims by licensing American claimants to negotiate settlements directly with
Cuba, including equity participation in Cuban enterprises. See CFR Cuba Task
Force Urges Significant Changes in U.S. Policy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
http://www.cfr.org/Public/media/pressreleases2000_112900.html. The U.S. Gov-
ernment has not authorized such direct negotiations in the past.
57. See Dames & Moore, 453 U. S. at 686-90.
58. There are indications that at least some major U.S. claimants would be interested
in alternative methods to settle their claims. Amstar Says, Let's Make a Deal,
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The sorts of potential negotiated remedies are briefly discussed below.
b. Restitution
(1) Direct Restitution
Restitution of the actual property that was confiscated (direct restitu-
tion) would be the solution that some U.S. corporate claimants might pre-
fer. Some types of expropriated property, e.g. large industrial
installations, may lend themselves readily to direct restitution because the
identity of the former owners is likely to be uncontested and the extent of
the ownership rights may be easy to establish.
But direct restitution may be difficult to implement even for readily
identifiable property because the ability to grant restitution of the actual
property seized by the Cuban Government may be negated by a variety
of circumstances. The property may have been destroyed or substantially
deteriorated; it may have been subject to transformation, merger, subdi-
vision, improvement, or other substantial changes; it may have been de-
voted to a use that may not be easily reversed or which may have
substantial public utility; or its character may be such that the state de-
cides for policy reasons not to return to its former owners. In such cases,
some form of compensation would need to be given.
In addition, in the last twenty years Cuba (through state-owned enter-
prises) has entered into a number of joint ventures with foreign, non-U.S.
investors.59 Many of these ventures involve property that was expropri-
ated from U.S. and Cuban nationals.6 In deciding whether to provide
direct restitution of those properties to the U.S. claimants, the Cuban
Government must balance the rights and interests of the former owners
against those of third-parties who have invested in Cuba. Also, the rights
of any other lessors, occupants, or other users of the property would have
to be taken into account in deciding whether direct restitution should
occur.
Where direct restitution is the appropriate remedy, a number of mat-
ters will have to be worked out between Cuba and the U.S. claimants.
For example, Cuba may want to impose restrictions or requirements on
the claimants' use of the property, or on their ability to transfer title for a
certain period of time after restitution. Also, a potentially complex valu-
ation process may need to be undertaken if the property has been im-
proved since being expropriated. In some instances, an agreement will
CUBA NEWS, Jan. 1996, at 6. There is also precedent for such flexibility. The U.S.
settlement agreement with Germany, for example, allows U.S. nationals to forego
their portions of the settlement amount and instead pursue their claims under Ger-
many's program for the resolution of claims arising from East Germany's expro-
priations. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Settle-
ment of Certain Property Claims, supra note 43, at art. 3; 57 Fed. Reg. 53175,
53176 (November 6, 1992).
59. Travieso-Diaz, LAWS AND LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 34, at 76.
60. Id.
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need to be reached in advance on the recovering owner's responsibility
for the environmental reclamation of the property, to the extent that eco-
logical impacts from operation of the facility have occurred or are ex-
pected to occur in the future. Many other issues are likely to come up in
individual cases.
Cuba may also decide to impose a "transfer tax" or equivalent fee on
the restitution transaction. 61 The purposes of such tax would be to raise
funds for other aspects of the program, and to ensure that settlement of
the claim by restitution does not leave a claimant in a better position than
that of other claimants who have availed themselves of other forms of
recovery.
(2) Substitutional Restitution
There may be instances in which direct restitution will be impractical or
undesirable, but both Cuban and U.S. claimants will still wish to apply a
restitution type of remedy.6 2 Such circumstances may dictate restitution
of substitute property (that is, the transfer to the claimant of other prop-
erty, equivalent in value to the one confiscated). Where restitution of
substitute property is proposed, it will be necessary to set rules on, among
other things, how the equivalence of the properties is to be established.
Substitutional restitution may be appropriate, for example, in cases
where the confiscated property is farmland that has been conveyed to co-
operatives or divided among small farmers. Rather than dispossessing
the current occupants, Cuba may offer to convey to the U.S. claimants
agricultural or other lands in state hands that may be equivalent to those
expropriated.
Restitution-whether direct or substitutional-could be an important
ingredient in the mix of remedies available to U.S. claimants who entered
into negotiations with the Cuban Government. It will be inappropriate in
many instances. And even where appropriate, its use should be tempered
by the realization that restitution will often be a slow and difficult pro-
cess, and one subject to contentious disputes among a variety of claim-
ants, including former owners and their successors, current occupants,
and others. In addition, if a variety of remedies are offered, care must be
taken to assure that the benefits received by those availing themselves of
the restitution alternative are neither better nor worse off than those re-
ceiving other types of remedy.
c. Issuance of State Obligations
A number of Eastern European countries used state-issued instru-
ments, which will be generally referred to here as "vouchers," to provide
full or partial compensation to expropriation claimants.63 The vouchers
61. Id.
62. Id. at 77.
63. Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Properties in Cuba,
supra note 12, at 70.
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may not be redeemed for cash but can be used, among other things: as
collateral for loans; to pay (fully or in part) for property sold by the state,
including shares in privatized enterprises; to purchase real estate put up
for sale by the state; to be exchanged for annuities; or as investment
instruments.64
The voucher system provides a potential way of resolving the claims of
those U.S. nationals who may not be interested in recovering the proper-
ties they once owned because of the obsolescence or physical deteriora-
tion of the facilities. The system recognizes the limits of the country's
ability to pay compensation claims, and avoids the dislocation costs and
disputes associated with direct restitution systems. An issue that would
need to be resolved at the outset would be the level of compensation to
be offered in proportion to the loss.
The system has potentially great flexibility because the vouchers could
be used for a variety of purposes, some of which may be more attractive
than others to individual claimants. Also, in addition to vouchers, other
state-issued instruments could be used as means of compensating U.S.
claimants. These include annuities, bonds, promissory notes, stock certifi-
cates, and other debt or equity instruments.
There are, however, several potential drawbacks to a system of vouch-
ers or other state-issued instruments. 65 The instruments will fluctuate in
value and are likely to depreciate if Cuba's economy stagnates. In addi-
tion, to the extent the instruments are used as income-generating devices
(e.g., for the collection of annuities), the rate of return is likely to be very
low. 6 6 Also, the basic underpinning of a voucher system is confidence in
the state's ability to make good on its commitments. 67 Therefore, the
security, transferability, and marketability of the compensation instru-
ments is a serious concern that the Cuban Government will need to over-
come in order for the remedy to have acceptability with the claimants.
d. Other Compensation Mechanisms
Other remedies that might be utilized in Cuba, and have not yet been
tried elsewhere, could consist of economic incentives to invest in the
country.68 These remedies could include, for example: giving credits on
taxes and duties to the extent of all or part of the claim amount; granting
the ability to exchange the claim for other investment opportunities, such
as management contracts, beneficial interests in state-owned enterprises,
or preferences in government contracting; and conferring other benefits.
Each claimant might be interested in a different "package," so ad-hoc,
case-by-case negotiations would need to be conducted, at least to resolve
the most significant claims.
64. Id.
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The second stage of claims resolution could be initiated concurrently
with the first, but may extend for a considerable period of time to allow
for potentially complex negotiations to be conducted between the claim-
ants and Cuba.
3. Stage Three: Binding International Arbitration
A direct settlement between a U.S. claimant and Cuba, if successful,
should satisfy the claimant in that it would represent the best resolution
that he was able to obtain through bargaining with Cuba.69 But success is
not assured. Therefore, to address the situation where direct negotiations
were not fruitful or the claimant was not interested in pursuing negotia-
tions, the United States and Cuba would have to have agreed on a mech-
anism for assuring that those claimants were not left without a remedy.
That would bring about the next stage in the process.
One way of protecting the rights of the U.S. claimants would be for the
Cuban Government to agree to submit to binding international arbitra-
tion regarding any claim that it was unable to settle with a U.S. national.
Historically, however, arbitration of disputes between private citizens and
states has resulted in inconsistent decisions on key issues. In Saudi Ara-
bia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), for example, the arbitra-
tion tribunal refused to apply the law of Switzerland (where the tribunal
was located), even though Saudi Arabia had agreed to having the seat of
the tribunal in Switzerland. 70 By contrast, the arbitrator in Sapphire In-
ternational Petroleum v. National Iranian Oil Co., decided that the legal
system of the place of arbitration would govern the arbitration.7 1 Like-
wise, inconsistent results on this issue were achieved in three other arbi-
trations between Libya and the nationals of foreign states that arose out
of the nationalization of Libyan oil in the early 1970s. 7 2 This lack of uni-
formity and predictability in the outcomes underscores the need to estab-
lish clearly, and in advance, the legal regime that would govern the
arbitration of disputes between U.S. citizens and the Cuban
government.
69. Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Properties in Cuba,
supra note 12, at 65.
70. 27 I.L.R. 117 (1958).
71. 35 I.L.R. 136 (1963).
72. British Petroleum Expl. Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 297 (1973) (decid-
ing that the municipal procedural law would govern the arbitration); Texaco Over-
seas Petroleum & Ca. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978) (holding that
local law was not to be applied to the arbitration); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libyan
Arab Repub., 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981) (leaving unclear whether the arbitration was gov-
erned by the international legal system or the place of arbitration).
73. Predictability of applicable rules could be achieved if the United States and Cuba
agreed in advance to a procedure analogous to that used by the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal (Tribunal) set up to resolve the expropriation claims of U.S. nationals
against Iran. See Norton, supra note 29, at 482-486. One important aspect of the
Tribunal's framework is the adoption of The United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law's (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, which are designed to ad-
dress international commercial arbitration. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
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Apart from legal considerations, the main difficulty involved in estab-
lishing a tribunal to adjudicate disputes between a U.S. claimant and
Cuba would be that provisions would have to be made for Cuba to set up
an independent source of funds available to satisfy tribunal awards. Oth-
erwise, a victory by a U.S. claimant in arbitration could prove pyrrhic
because no funds might be available from which to satisfy the award. For
that reason, Stage Three should be initiated at a later time than the first
two stages, and its success would depend among other things on Cuba's
economic recovery.
4. (Hypothetical) Stage Four: Participation in Cuba's Claim Resolution
Program
Assuming that it was not feasible or productive to have direct negotia-
tions between U.S. claimants and Cuba, another alternative could be to
allow U.S. nationals to participate in Cuba's domestic claims resolution
program, were such a program to be instituted. But the types of remedies
available to U.S. nationals opting to participate in a parallel Cuban do-
mestic claims program would of necessity have to be few in number, rela-
tively straightforward in execution, and demand little in the way of up-
front cash outlays by the state. The results of a domestic Cuban process
would be likely, therefore, to leave many claimants dissatisfied.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States
and Cuba effective July 1, 2015, representatives of the two countries have
been meeting to discuss a possible resolution of the expropriation claims
issue. Despite the limited economic reforms that Cuba has implemented
under Raill Castro since 2010, it is most likely that the negotiations will
be held while Cuba is besieged by a depressed economy and an unstable
political situation.
The conditions under which the settlement will be negotiated will
greatly restrict the remedies that Cuba will be able to offer the U.S.
claimants. Certainly, the traditional way of settling expropriation
claims-i.e., Cuba's payment of a lump sum of money to the U.S. Gov-
ernment to be distributed pro-rata among all claimants-will not be ade-
quate across the board, given Cuba's inability to pay a significant portion
of the amounts it owes. Lump-sum compensation should be given to the
vast majority of U.S. nationals to the extent funds are available, but
should be substituted with (for those claimants not eligible for a lump-
sum settlement) a variety of other remedies to be negotiated by the
claimants with Cuba, including restitution of the expropriated assets,
compensation through state-issued instruments, and other means. While
the eventual solution reached in each case is likely to grant only partial
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/201OAr
bitrationrules.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).
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recovery to the claimant, the results in most cases would probably be
more beneficial to these claimants than if they were included in a com-
prehensive lump-sum distribution. All else failing, a fallback program for
binding arbitration of unresolved claims would have to be available to
provide additional avenues of recovery for those who did not have other
ways of obtaining redress for their claims.
A. RECOMMENDATION
As the discussion in this paper shows, even a very modest scheme for
resolving the certified claims of U.S. nationals requires the U.S. Govern-
ment to make a number of important and unprecedented policy deci-
sions. For example, the U.S. Government will need to decide whether to
abandon the traditional "espousal" principle and adopt a more flexible
approach that includes, in addition to securing payments to the vast ma-
jority of claimants, allowing the other claimants to pursue direct negotia-
tions with Cuba to obtain redress.
These and other policy issues should be examined in the near term by a
multi-agency task force, perhaps with the assistance of outside experts.
The task force's mandate should include proposing legislation to permit
the use of frozen Cuban assets to defray lump sum payments, approve
any needed appropriations, and take other forms of legislative action.
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